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Abstract This study develops a causal model of the independent effect of organized
crime, rule of law, and corruption on national wealth. To measure the level of
organized crime a Composite Organized Crime Index (COCI) is constructed
combining data on the perceived prevalence of organized crime, unsolved
homicides, grand corruption, money-laundering and the extent of the black
economy, drawing on the World Economic Forum’s annual surveys among CEOs
of larger companies, the Merchant International Group’s assessments of investment
risks in 150 countries, studies by the World Bank Institute, and official crime
statistics. The findings of the explorative analysis show that a political strategy of
tolerating activities of local criminal groups in the hope of beneficial effects on the
wealth of a nation is unlikely to bring the expected results. Although some types of
organized crime may bring in significant revenues, tolerating Mafia-type activities
implies letting the Trojan horse of racketeering and grand corruption into the walls
of government.
Keywords Mafia markers . Organized crime . Rule of law
Introduction
There is a need of more and better statistics on organized crime and grand corruption
for both academic purposes and strategic planning in the fight against transnational
organized crime. Strenuous efforts are therefore made by international organizations
such as Europol and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to harmonize
official data of police and courts on transnational organized crime and corruption. It
seems doubtful that such administrative data will ever produce useful indicators of
Trends Organ Crim (2007) 10:39–56
DOI 10.1007/s12117-007-9013-x
J. Van Dijk (*)
Pieter van Vollenhoven Chair in Victimology, Human Security and Safety, University of Tilburg,
Tilburg, The Netherlands
e-mail: Jan.vanDijk@uvt.nl
the level of these types of crime across countries. In a global context numbers of
arrests or convictions for involvement in organized crime are likely to reflect police
performance rather than the true extent of criminal activity. In countries where
organized crime is most prevalent, investigations into such crimes will be hampered
by police corruption and political interference in prosecution and sentencing. Fewer
investigations or prosecutions of organized crime will be initiated or successfully
completed. Low rates of court cases on corruption or organized crime in a country
may point to high rather than low prevalence of such types of crime. High numbers
of arrests or convictions for corruption may indicate a comparatively low prevalence
of such crimes due to better policing (Lambsdorff 2006). Police-based information
on levels of organized crime will often be misleading. In the field of complex
crimes, statistics of police-recorded or court-recorded crimes are a source of
disinformation. The case of measuring levels of crime independently of the police is
even stronger regarding organized crime and corruption than regarding common
crime.
It is now generally acknowledged in criminology that the level of common crime
across countries can be successfully estimated through standardized victimization
surveys among the public (Van Dijk et al. 1990; United Nations 1999; Kury 2001;
Nieuwbeerta 2002; Lynch 2006). Standardized survey research among samples of
the public has opened new windows of opportunity for comparative crime
measurement. In this article an attempt will be made to develop a similar alternative
measurement of organized crime that can be used for statistical analyses of its
correlates and impact.
Diagnosing organized crime with the use of statistical “markers”
The first requirement of measuring organized crime in an international context is
agreement on its definition (Von Lampe 2004). Although definitions in national law
show great variation, criminologists describe organized crime as criminal activities
for material benefit by groups that engage in extreme violence, corruption of public
officials, including law enforcement and judicial officers, penetration of the
legitimate economy (e.g. through racketeering and money-laundering) and interfer-
ence in the political process (Kenney and Finckenauer 1995; Levi 2002). These
elements are not only incorporated in anti-Mafia laws of some countries, including
the USA, Italy and Hungary (Fijnaut and Paoli 2004) but are also used as operational
definitions by the European police community (Levi 2002).
Since ordinary households are not directly victimized by organized crime,
victimization surveys cannot be used as vehicle to measure this phenomenon. But
there seems to be no a priori reasons why the extent of organized crime as defined by
criminologists could not be measured cross-nationally by interviewing groups of the
population that are exposed to some of its defining traits. One of the most common
types of organized crime is racketeering including the collection of protection money
from businesses. Through victimization surveys among business executives reliable
information can be collected on the extent of extortion practices in business
communities in different countries (Van Dijk and Terlouw 1996). Since 1997 the
World Economic Forum has carried out annual surveys among CEOs of larger
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companies to identify obstacles to businesses. These surveys include a question on
the prevalence in the country of organized crime defined as “Mafia-oriented
racketeering, extortion”. Data are available on the prevalence of organized crime
according to business executives of 102 countries. An analysis was conducted of the
results from the seven rounds of WEF surveys conducted between 1997 and 2003.
National scores proved to be very consistent across years. To reduce sampling error,
the scores of the annual surveys were averaged. The resulting mean scores for 1997–
2003 are based on sample sizes of 500 or more. The national scores reflect the
perceived prevalence of organized crime in the period 1997 to 2003 according to
business executives.
Another source of cross-national data on perceived organized crime are risk
assessments made by international consultancy companies. The London-based
consultancy company Merchant International Group assesses investment risks in
over 150 countries including the prevalence of different types of organized crime.
The risk assessments concerning organized crime from MIG were found to be
strongly correlated to the perceptions of business executives of the WEF surveys. In
order to facilitate further statistical exploration, a composite index was constructed
based on the averaged rankings of countries on the WEF surveys of 1997 to 2003
and the assessments of organized crime prevalence of MIG.1 The resulting
Organized Crime Perception Index (OCPI) refers to the level of different types of
organized crime activities such as extortion and drugs, arms and people trafficking as
perceived by potential victim groups and/or independent experts.
The widespread perception among business executives and risk consultants that
organized crime activities are relatively common in a country provides by itself no
conclusive proof that this is actually the case, but it certainly provides ground for
further examination. It can be regarded as a first statistical “marker” of organized
crime presence. What other proxy indicators of organized crime could be used? As
mentioned above, instrumental violence, corruption of public officials and money-
laundering are regarded as other defining characteristics of organized crime. It is
indeed hard to imagine a country where organized crime is rampant without
significant amounts of these three Mafia-related phenomena. Statistical indicators
were selected for the prevalence of each of these three defining characteristics of
organized crime. Police-recorded homicides can be roughly divided into emotional
attacks on intimates and cool-blooded killings executed by organized crime. The
perpetrators of the first category are in most cases arrested. The perpetrators of the
second category are not. To develop a proxy measure of ‘mob-related violence’,
rates of unsolved homicides were calculated by deducting numbers of convictions
for homicide from the numbers of police-recorded homicides.2 The resulting country
rates of unsolved murders per 100,000 population were found to be fairly strongly
correlated to the national scores on the Organized Crime Perception Index (r=0.57;
n=63; p<0.05). Similarly a proxy indicator of ‘high level corruption’ was derived
from data sets of the World Bank Institute and indicators of money-laundering and
1 For an explanation of the methodology of the index, please consult Kangaspunta et al. (1998) or Van
Dijk (2007).
2 Both types of data were drawn from the crime and criminal justice surveys of UNODC (Shaw et al.
2003).
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the extent of the black economy were taken from the World Economic Forum
surveys among business executives. All three indicators proved to be strongly
correlated to the scores on the Organized Crime Perception Index as well. These
findings support the construction of a composite organized crime index combining
the five interrelated proxy indicators: perceived prevalence of organized crime,
especially racketeering, unsolved homicides, grand corruption, money-laundering
and the extent of the black economy (cronbach’s alpha vs. 82).
An important strategic advantage of the resulting Composite Organized Crime Index
is the incorporation of at least one objective measure of organized crime activity, the rate
of unsolved homicides according to official administrations. Scores on this composite
index cannot be dismissed by governments as being based on ‘just perceptions’. The
scores are corroborated by the official ‘body counts’ of national police authorities as
reported to the United Nations through the Crime Surveys of UNODC.
Table 1 depicts the mean scores on the Composite Organized Crime Index of
world regions. To allow a more detailed diagnosis of regional problems with
organized crime, the picture presents both the absolute scores of regions on the
composite index as well as the rank numbers on the five source indicators used.
The ranking of regions according to the composite index and those according to
the five constituting indicators show a high degree of consistency. Outliers are the
Table 1 Regional mean scores on composite organized crime index (COCI) and data on source
indicators: perceived organized crime prevalence, grand corruption, money-laundering, extent of shadow





















Oceania 33 1 1 1 2 1
West and central Europe 35 2 2 2 4 3
North America 44 4 4 4 6 4
East and south east Asia 45 5 3 7 3 6
Central America 50 4 13 3 8 13
Near and Middle East 50 7 6 11 1 2
World 54
South Asia 54 13 8 8 7 11
North Africa 55 6 5 6 5
East Africa 55 11 9 11 9
Southern Africa 56 9 12 5 12 10
South America 58 10 14 10 13 12
Southeast Europe 58 14 10 12 9 14
West and central Africa 60 12 11 15 5 8
East Europe 70 16 16 14 14 16
Central Asia and
Transcaucasian
70 15 13 15
Caribbean 70 8 15 16 15
Items and sources used: Organized crime perception (World Economic Forum, World Competitiveness
Reports, Business Executive Surveys, 1997–2003; Merchant International Group 2004; BEEPS 1996);
Money-laundering and Informal sector (World Economic Forum Business Executive Survey, 2004); High
Level Corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2003), Unsolved Homicides (8th UN Survey on Crime and Justice
2002: www.UNODC.org).
42 Trends Organ Crim (2007) 10:39–56
relatively high rank numbers on informal sector and money-laundering of Central
America. Among the high crime regions, West and Central Africa shows relatively
low rank number on homicides. The latter result could point to a shortcoming in the
available statistics—homicide statistics for Nigeria are for example missing. It could
also reflect that organized crime groups in the region are less prone to the use of
extreme violence than elsewhere. Such deviations suggest that further research is
needed before conclusions can be drawn.
Country scores
The combination of data from different sources allows the calculation of scores for a
large number of individual countries. The rank numbers of countries for different
indicators are mostly in the same range as the COCI rank but many deviations can be
found. Deviations of single indicators from the COCI rank can point to specific
features of organized crime in the country or to deficiencies in some of the measures.
In both cases further research is indicated. In some cases the diagnosis at the country
level can only be very tentative due to lack of sufficient information on the source
indicators, notably on the numbers of unsolved homicides. At this stage of
development, the utility of the index lies more in the possibility to carry out
analyses of the macro correlates of organized crime than in the benchmarking of
individual countries for policy purposes (Van Dijk 2007).
Figure 1a and b show the global and European maps of organized crime, based on
the organized crime perception index.
As said, the rates of individual countries should not be taken at face value but be
used as a basis for further enquiry. In Asia rates are the worst in parts of South Asia
(Pakistan, Bangladesh). But also China and India are rated unfavorably (even more
than Italy with its notorious problems in the south). In the international literature on
organized crime India is rarely the focus of attention. Research on Chinese organized
crime is mainly focussed on Chinese expatriates. Limited available research findings
on homeland China point to collusion between corrupt communist party members
and local gangs in remote areas (Zhang 2001). More research on the role of the
organized crime-corruption in these two emerging superpowers seems warranted.
In Africa, Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique stand out with the highest scores.
Nigerian organized crime activity in both the country and the region has been well-
documented (Shaw 2003; UNODC 2005). A detailed account of how organized
crime threatens to penetrate state and businesses in southern Africa, notably in
Mozambique, is given in Gastrow (2003). In Latin America, Haiti, Paraguay,
Guatemala, Venezuela and Colombia show the highest scores. High scores are also
observed in Jamaica. None of these scores will come as a surprise to informed
readers.
Within Europe, organized crime prevalence increases diagonally from the north
west to the south east, with levels being low in England and Germany, higher in
Spain and Italy and by far the highest in Russia, Albania and Ukraine. The annual
surveys of the World Economic Forum point at incremental improvements in some
of the new members of the European Union.
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Relationships between indicators of types of crime
The primary utility of the organized crime indices lies, as said, in the possibility to
carry out analyses of the macro correlates of organized crime. The first issue that
seems worth exploring is whether the distribution of organized crime is similar to
that of common crime across countries. Country rates for common crime are
available from the third and fourth round of the International Crime Victim Survey
Fig. 1 a Global map with scores on organized crime perception index. b European map with scores on
organized crime perception index
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for 62 countries (Van Dijk 2007). Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of country values on
the ICVS 1992–2000 and of national scores on the comprehensive organized crime
index.
Countries placed in the upper right quarter are experiencing high levels of both
organized and common crime (e.g. Colombia, Zimbabwe) and those in the bottom
left corner show low scores on both types of crime (e.g. Switzerland, Botswana and
Canada). A large number of countries are situated in neither of these two
homogeneous groups. Their ranking on the level of common crime according to
the ICVS is very different from their ranking in terms of organized crime.
The perceived prevalence of organized crime and the overall ICVS rates of
victimization by common crime were found to be unrelated (r=0.02¸ n.s.). The
world map of organized crime differs fundamentally from that of common crimes.
This result suggests that levels of common crime and of organized crime are
determined by different factors at the macro level (Van Dijk and Nevala 2002).
Common crime shows a clear downward trend in many Western countries since
1995 (Van Dijk 2007). There are no indications of similar declines in the level of
organized crime or corruption (Lambsdorff 2006; Van Dijk 2007). Complex crimes
should be analysed separately from volume crime. This finding confirms the need of
developing separate indicators of organized crime and other complex crimes that can
complement the results of the ICVS.
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Fig. 2 International Crime Victim Survey and Organized Crime Index
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Organized crime and the rule of law
Elsewhere we have documented a strong link between a measure of police
performance3 and our indices of organized crime (Van Dijk 2007). The correlation
coefficient between country scores on police performance and on the composite
index of organized crime was very strong (r=0.80; n=113; p<0.05). Where police
forces operate more professionally, levels of organized crime tend to remain
relatively modest. Case histories have revealed the crucial role of independent and
competent prosecution services and judiciaries in tackling organized crime and
corruption (Orlando 2001; Joly 2003). Special attention has therefore also been
given to the relationship between the rule of law, including perceived independence
of the judiciary, and the level of organized crime. For this purpose we used a
composite measure of the rule of law developed by the World Bank Institute
(Kaufmann et al. 2003). Figure 2 shows the relationship between country values on
this index of the rule of law and our composite index indicating country levels of
organized crime (Fig. 3).
Organized crime is more prevalent in countries where the rule of law is less well
assured and vice versa. There are very few exceptions to this rule.4 The maintenance
of the rule of law in the face of powerful Mafia groups requires first and foremost an
independent, incorruptible judiciary. A separate analysis was made of the
relationship between the organized crime index and the perceived independence of
the judiciary specifically (WEF survey 2003). The two variables were found to be
strongly correlated (r=0.79). Multivariate analyses confirmed the relationship
between the measure of judicial independence and levels of organized crime. Previous
analyses showed furthermore that independence of the judiciary was the single most
important predictor of the extent of organized crime (Buscaglia and Van Dijk 2003;
Hung-En Sung 2004).
The critical factor determining the extent of organized crime is the quality of
institutions responsible for the rule of law, including competent police services and
independent courts complying with standards of professional integrity.
These results signify that criminal justice systems and organized crime groups
impact negatively upon each other at the country level. High levels of organized
crime rarely go together with strong policing and effective maintenance of the rule of
law. Law enforcement and criminal justice probably play a significantly larger role
in shaping the phenomenon of organized crime and related high-level corruption
than in determining levels of volume crime. Well performing police services and
independent, professional judiciaries seem to make a difference in controlling non-
3 The Police Performance Index is a composite index incorporating information on the clearance rate of
homicides, rate of victims of crime reporting to the police, satisfaction of victims and assessments of the
public and the business community of police effectiveness in controlling crime (Van Dijk 2007).
4 The rule of law index of the World Bank Institute comprises a large number of source indicators from
different sources. Although one of the many indicators used is the WEF indicator of perceived organized
crime that is also included in the Composite Organized Crime Index, this is unlikely to have had much
effect on the correlation. Equally strong correlations have been found between the Organized Crime index
and other indices of the rule of law not including the WEF indicator (Buscaglia and Van Dijk 2003).
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conventional crime. The role of the criminal justice system in fighting conventional
crime has in the past perhaps been somewhat overrated (Waller 2006). But in the
fight against complex crimes, including the organized crime-corruption nexus, the
importance of criminal justice seems rather to be somewhat underrated.5
Good governance, crime and national wealth
In ‘comparative economics’ it is now more and more acknowledged that sound legal
infrastructures, especially those governing ‘property rights’, are a primary
determinant of economic performance (Acemoglu and Johnson 2003).6 Empirical
studies have specifically demonstrated that various dimensions of ‘good governance’
6 Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) found that institutions protecting institutions against expropriations by
the government and powerful elites have a stronger effect on long term economic performance of countries
than institutions enabling private contracts between citizens. Translated in conventional legal terminology
this result would mean that public law, of which criminal law is part and parcel, is more important to
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Fig. 3 Quality of Rule of Law (including independence of the judiciary) and Prevalence of Organized
crime (Composite Organized Crime Index) per country
5 In many countries, including The Netherlands, journalists specializing in organized crime reporting
entertain close relations with key figures of local organized crime who feed them with information. One
possible explanation of the lack of recognition of the role of police units and judiciaries in controlling
organized crime may be that public perceptions are negatively influenced by media information
discrediting police officers, prosecutors and judges.
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are prerequisites for sustainable economic development (Mauro 1996). Good
governance, including the rule of law, has been found to be a critical success factor
for sustainable development (Eiras 2003; Kaufmann et al. 2003). Some recent studies
have confirmed the prominent role of protection of property rights and independent
judiciaries for economic success (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004; Feld and Voigt
2003). In analyses of the World Bank Institute “state capture”—defined as undue
influence on laws, policies, and regulation by special interest groups—and other
manifestations of ‘crony capitalism’ or ‘economic elitism’, have been identified as
root causes of institutional failure hampering development (Kaufmann 2004).
The strong statistical relationships between measures of ‘governance’ and
economic growth or performance do not by themselves provide evidence that
economic performance is driven by institutional quality. The causal effects might
also be the other way around. There are several arguments why this alternative
interpretation of the governance growth correlations is less plausible though. It
should first of all be understood that good governance such as independent
judiciaries does not require expenditures that only rich countries can afford.
Independently functioning judiciaries depend more on sound legislation and political
will than on availability of resources. On theoretical grounds it seems more likely
that institutional quality causes wealth rather than that wealth causes institutional
quality. There is also ample empirical evidence for the causal impact of governance
on growth. Institutional failures have found to be not only correlated to current
economic performance but also to future economic performance (Knack and Keefer
1995). In an empirical analysis of historical data on these issues Kaufmann and
Kraay (2002) have refuted the notion that economic growth results in incremental
strengthening of legal and institutional arrangements for ‘good governance’. Their
results suggest the absence of ‘virtuous circles’ in which higher revenues due to an
economic boost and/or massive development aid automatically lead to further
improvements in governance. Experiences in South America and Eastern Europe in
particular show that higher levels of affluence do not necessarily translate into better
governance. In periods of prosperity, established interest groups unduly influencing
state policies may become even more entrenched because the stakes have become
higher (Kaufmann 2004).
By the same token economic prosperity based on the discovery and subsequent
rapid exploitation of rich natural resources such as oil or diamonds acts for many
developing countries as an economic ‘curse in disguise’. In many cases such
resource dependency provokes the capture of the state by criminal elites and thereby
stifles rather than promotes economic activity.7 The law and development literature
provides several examples of countries where the possession of oil, diamonds or
7 “Wealthier countries of the OECD, as well as some in Eastern Europe find themselves in the ‘good
equilibrium’ of relatively low tax and regulatory burden, sizeable revenue mobilization, good rule of law
and corruption control, and [relatively] small unofficial economy’, according to Johnson et al. (1998). ‘By
contrast, a number of countries in Latin American and the Former Soviet Union exhibit characteristics
consistent with a ‘bad equilibrium’: tax and regulatory discretion and burden on the firm is high, the rule
of law is weak, and there is a high incidence of bribery and a relatively high share of activities in the
unofficial economy”. To this salient conclusion one could add that, not coincidentally, organized crime is
prominently present across the countries of Latin America and the former Soviet Union, as shown in
Fig. 1a.
48 Trends Organ Crim (2007) 10:39–56
other natural resources could have resulted in stronger institutions and subsequent
lasting economic growth—as has been the case in Botswana—but where in reality
the opposite has taken place. The revenues from resources are just as likely to
generate rampant corruption and subsequent weakened institutions and diminished
economic growth. Examples where such negative side effects seems to have
prevailed are Angola, Nigeria, Zambia, Gabon and Venezuela (McMillan 2005).
The political implications of the finding that institutions are the driving forces
behind economic development cannot be overestimated. An improvement in a
country of, for example, 6 points on the Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index, may increase GDP by more than 20% (Lambsdorff 2004). The
economic consequences of improved judicial infrastructures have also been quantified.
When the quality of the rule of law is measured on a scale of 1 to 10, every point of
improvement generates between 0.2 and 0.8 additional economic growth per year
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004; Tornstensson 1994). If all African countries would
succeed in building up judicial infrastructures that match those in South Africa or
Botswana, many of them would soon be known as the “African lions”.
In the discussion on “Mafia markers” reference was made to the close link
between organized crime and corruption. The two phenomena are interlinked to such
an extent that an indicator of grand corruption was included in our composite index
of organized crime. In many parts of the world grand corruption and organized crime
are two sides of the same coin. Surprisingly little attention is given in the law and
economics literature just cited to the possible specific role of criminal justice and
organized crime control in the institutional arrangements determining ‘good
governance’ or the lack of it. As the final step in our analysis we will explore the
links between the organized crime–corruption nexus, functioning law enforcement
and justice systems and sustainable development. We will start with a theoretical
cost-benefits assessment of organized crime and then revert to our metrics to analyse
empirically the relationships between police performance, criminal justice, organized
crime and economic performance.
Costs and benefits of organized crime
On the cost side, high levels of conventional crime, just as high levels of corruption,
add to the immediate costs of doing business in a country. In one of its latest World
Development Report, the World Bank sums up its evolving thoughts on the issue:
‘crime...increases the cost of business, whether through direct loss of goods or the
costs of taking precautions such as hiring security guards, building fences, or installing
burglar alarm systems. In the extreme, foreign firms will decline to invest, and
domestic ones will flee the country for a more peaceful locale’ (World Bank 2005).
In the business executives opinion surveys of the World Economic Forum
respondents are specifically asked to identify the most important obstacles to doing
business in their country. Business executives in many countries list corruption and/or
crime and violence as the most or second most important impediments to doing
business in their countries (WEF 2003). This is often the case in countries with
comparatively high scores on our index for organized crime prevalence. These
opinions of business leaders working in high crime countries confirm the negative
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impact of organized crime on investments. In recent Investment Climate Surveys, 15%
of business executives reported that crime was a major constraint on investment (29%
of African executives gave this response; Brunetti et al. 1997). In some instances
rampant organized crime may also deter foreign tourists from visiting the country.
Security concerns are known to be among the most important considerations for
selecting holiday destinations (World Tourism Organization 1997).
In Mafia-infested countries the costs of crime may go far beyond company losses
to ‘criminal leakage’ and ‘loss of customers’. In an important revision of the good
governance theory, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) have attributed the negative
influence of high-level corruption on development to the intermediary factor of
‘cronyism’, the widespread interference of particular interest groups in rational
decision-making in the economic domain.8 Infiltration in the legitimate economy
and political process is, as discussed, a defining characteristic of Mafia-type
organizations. If such ‘crony capitalism’ is indeed the main impediment of economic
development, organized crime, as an especially entrenched type of ‘cronyism’, may
well be at the heart of the governance-related economic problems of many countries.
The Sicilian economy, for example, seems to have been seriously hampered by the
reign of the Mafia and started to prosper only after the local Mafia bosses were put
on the defensive through the maxi-trials and community mobilization (Orlando
2001).9 The experience with racketeering in New York also points to economic
revitalization after the defeat of mob-related racketeering in several sectors of the
local economy (Giuliani 2002).
Although organized crime groups are likely to be part of the problem of crony-
capitalism, the overall impact of their criminal activities on the economy may not
always be only negative. The production and trafficking of illicit commodities can
result in considerable profits that are reinvested in the formal and informal economy
of countries. Australian criminologist John Walker has estimated the total value of
illicit drugs at wholesale value at $94 billion (World Drug Report 2005). This is the
equivalent of the export values of the agricultural commodities meat and cereals
combined. At retail level the total value of illicit drugs is estimated at $322 billion.
Countries dominating the production and/or trafficking of illicit drugs will obviously
benefit economically from their activities on these markets to some extent.
Narco dollars generated by the cocaine trade in the Americas are indeed known to
have given a significant boost to national economies in Latin America in the 1990s.
The total value of illicit drugs trafficking, annually injected into the Mexican
economy in those years, has been estimated at over $25 billion, or 6% of the
country’s GDP (Gonzalez-Ruiz 2001). In Tajikistan heroin trafficking revenues have
been estimated as equivalent to 50% of recorded GDP (Reuter et al. 2004). More
recently, estimated revenues from drugs in Afghanistan vary from 30% to as much as
60% of GDP. There can be no doubt that the heroin trade has fueled the Afghan
economy as well as the economies of several transit countries since the defeat of the
Taliban (UNODC, World Drug Report 2004). It is also widely assumed that
8 In a case study of ‘cronyism’ in a Latin American country by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), drug cartels
and other organized crime groups are mentioned as key examples of the phenomenon.
9 Moody Financial Certification, a financial analysis agency, upgraded its rating of the city of Palermo to
Aa3, meaning excellent, in 2000.
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countries with offshore centers specializing in money-laundering facilitation reap
significant benefits of such illicit financial services.
To empirically explore whether orgnanised crime hampers or spurs economic
growth, the correlations between the composite measure of organized crime
prevalence and indicators of economic development were analysed. The index for
organized crime prevalence was found to have a moderately strong negative
correlation to the Human Development Index (r=0.49). The negative relationship
between organized crime prevalence and GDP per 100,000 population was even
stronger (r=0.76). Figure 4 shows results in the form of a scatter plot.
The results depicted in Fig. 4 lend empirical support to the hypothesis that on
balance organized crime is bad for the economy. In the case of cultivation,
production or trafficking in illicit drugs organized crime may generate sizeable
illegal profits but its prominence deters investment and impairs the capacity of
governments to promote sustainable economic growth. Countries where organized
crime groups are insufficiently reigned in, are economically in dire straits.
The fairly strong inverse correlation between organized crime and collective
wealth merits further examination. As discussed above there are good reasons to
assume that the inverse relationship between organized crime and wealth is mediated
by governance factors such as police performance, the rule of law and corruption at
the political level. In our view organized crime is negatively related to police
performance and the rule of law and positively related to grand corruption. Effective



































































































































Fig. 4 Prevalence of organized crime (composite organized crime index) and GDP per capita
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economic development. Organized crime, then, will reduce economic development
through its negative impact on policing and on the maintenance of the rule of law
and through its positive impact upon corrupt practices at the highest level of
government. Unclear seem the possible direct effects of organized crime on the
economy. Although the inversed correlation between organized crime prevalence
and economic wealth is strong, there are, as Fig. 4 shows, several outliers. The
scatter plot shows that some countries with very high levels of organized crime
nevertheless enjoy reasonably high levels of wealth (they are in the middle range for
GDP rather than near the expected bottom end). This category of economically
‘overperforming’ high-crime countries includes Mexico, Russia, Venezuela, Colombia
and Guatemala. Their relative wealth in spite of rampant organized crime/corruption
might point to the positive direct effects of organized crime through crime-related
economic injections. Although none of these countries enjoy the stably high GDP
levels of the OECD countries, they might perhaps have been even poorer without their
criminally acquired riches.
To explore the crimino-economic dynamics outlined above, we have first carried
out a multiple regression analysis with GDP per capita as dependent variable. As
independent variables we used country scores on the Organized Crime Perception
Index, an index for grand corruption, developed by Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003),
the Rule of Law Index of the World Bank Institute and our index for Police
Performance. The four independent variables combined explained 74% of the
variance in GDP scores of countries. Table 2 shows results.
The strongest negative relationship was that between corruption and GDP
(beta=−0.551). The rule of law indicator showed a positive correlation, indepen-
dently of corruption (r=0.363). Police performance also contributes, independently
of the other factors, to wealth. Somewhat surprisingly for a variable with a strong
negative correlation with GDP in a simple, two-dimensional model, organized crime
was positively related to GDP, after controlling for the effects of corruption and rule
of law (beta=+0.256).
One theoretically plausible model to explain these results assumes that organized
crime leads to both lesser rule of law and weaker policing and to more corruption
which all three lead to lower wealth. These indirect effects may fully explain the
negative relationship between organized crime and wealth. The direct effect of
organized crime on wealth, after controlling for the indirect effects, may disappear or
even turn positive, as suggested by the outcome of the regression analysis.
In our final analysis, we looked at the independent effect of organized crime, rule
of law, and corruption on wealth in a causal model representing the mechanisms just
described. In this final analysis we used the Composite Organized Crime Index for
Table 2 Results of a stepwise multiple regression analysis with GDPpc as dependent variable (low–high)
Independent variables Beta coefficients Sig Multiple r
Rule of law (low–high) 0.363 0.008 0.781
Org. crime (low–high) 0.256 0.023 0.783
Corruption (low–high) −0.551 0.000 0.854
Police (low–high) 0.252 0.017 0.871
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organized crime, the corruption index of Transparency International for corruption
and the Rule of Law Index of the World Bank.10 The model explains 65% of the
total variance in the level of wealth and can thus be considered as fairly strong. In
the model the negative relationship between organized crime and wealth does once
again changed into a positive relationship in a multivariate analysis, controlling for
the strong indirect, negative effects through rule of law and corruption. Figure 5
shows the results.
Although the precise values found in this analysis should not be taken at face
value11—replication studies (using other indicators) may result in slightly different
outcomes—the results fully confirm the assumed dual impact of organized crime on
the economy. On one hand organized crime goes together with compromised state
institutions and rampant grand corruption. These factors hamper economic growth.
On the other hand organized crime may bring in considerable profits from criminal
activities which by itself may give a boost to the economy. This result should not
lead to the conclusion that up to a certain point organized crime can be beneficial for
national economies. The overall net effect of organized crime on the economy
through the paths of weakened governance and rampant corruption, is strongly
negative (see Fig. 4 above).
The finding that on balance significant revenues from drugs trafficking or other
forms of lucrative crime slow down rather than strengthen economic growth may
seem paradoxical or surprising on first sight. But this phenomenon is actually just
another example of what development economists have called the ‘resource curse’
(McMillan 2005). As mentioned above, developing countries that are rich in natural
resources such as oil or diamonds often experience reduced rather than enhanced
economic growth. This is because their institutions are undermined by rampant
corruption at the highest level of government. Some of the main drugs exporting
countries seem to suffer from exactly the same predicament. In such countries drugs
generate by far the most profitable opportunities for ‘rent seeking’ by corrupt
officials (Reuter et al. 2004). While corrupt elites accumulate great personal wealth,
their countries remain underdeveloped and poor.
In conclusion
In this article we have used a newly designed index of organized crime for an
explorative analysis of the interrelations between organized crime, law enforcement,
rule of law and economic development. According to our findings, a political
10 Analyses using the same indices that were used in the multiple regression analysis would have yielded
very similar results. The fact that the use of different indicators of the key variables has little effect on the
results of the analysis shows these results to be robust.
11 An alternative path model which puts rule of law as the first independent variable and organized crime
and corruption as intermediary variables shows very similar results. Rule of law is positively related with
GDP both directly and indirectly through its impact on corruption. Rule of law is inversely related to
organized crime which itself is positively related to GDP.
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strategy of tolerating activities of local criminal groups in the hope of beneficial
effects on the wealth of a nation, is unlikely to bring the expected results. Although
some types of organized crime may bring in significant revenues, tolerating Mafia-
type activities implies letting the Trojan horse of racketeering and grand corruption
into the walls of government. The inevitable deleterious effects on law enforcement,
justice-related and political institutions will impede sustainable development in the
long run.
In our view, the most important negative effect of organized crime, offsetting all
possible benefits, is its pernicious impact on governance. Organized crime tends to
erode the integrity of those holding a public office, including those responsible for
upholding the rule of law. Where organized crime groups are powerful, legislation,
policy-making and legal rulings no longer serve the general interest but the interests
of the few. Through the pervasive bias of legislation, policy decisions and
jurisprudence, market efficiencies are undermined and both local and foreign
investors lose confidence in the legal and regulatory functions of the state and
consequently stay away. A national growth strategy based on tolerating organized
crime, is not just immoral but economically self defeating. Under such policies no
country will ever achieve sustainable development. Many forms of organized crime
such as drugs trafficking and illegal gambling are regarded as “victimless crimes”.
Although such crimes do not directly victimize individual persons, their overall
impact on society constitutes a grave form of collective victimization. In studies of
the costs of crime these indirect costs of organized crime at the collective level
should be given more attention (Cohen 2000).
Case studies of individual countries/territories as varied as the USA (New York),
Singapore, Botswana, Jordan, Hong Kong, South Africa and Taiwan document the
crucial role of proper legal infrastructures and zero tolerance for organized crime and
corruption in promoting economic growth (see e.g. the case studies of New York in
Jacobs 1999, and of Taiwan in Lintner 2002). In Chile, one of the economically best
performing countries in the region, a full-fledged ministry is tasked with the
protection of the interests of the state (Szczaranski 2002). In light of our analytical
findings such sustained investments in the control of organized crime-corruption
seem to pay off handsomely. In countries where the establishment of strong law
enforcement and justice institutions seems a feasible option, capacity building in
these sectors qualifies as a uniquely cost effective development strategy.
Fig. 5 Results of a structural model of the relationships between the prevalence of organized crime, rule
of law and corruption and country wealth
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